Explore the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the largest naval battle in history, fought from October 23–26, 1944, through the lens of Samuel Eliot Morison’s authoritative works. This pivotal World War II clash in the Pacific Theater showcased U.S. naval heroism, strategic decisions, and technological shifts that secured Allied victory. Visit the Fleet of Freedom to delve into this historic battle and admire the Charles Jones WWII Model Warship Collection, featuring meticulously crafted replicas of the ships that shaped Leyte Gulf.

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Introduction to leyte gulf - The Greatest Naval Clash of World War II

Welcome to the Fleet of Freedom’s in-depth exploration of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the largest naval battle in history, fought from October 23–26, 1944, in the Pacific Theater of World War II. This pivotal clash, meticulously chronicled by naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison in History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume XII: Leyte and The Two-Ocean War, marked a turning point in the Allied campaign to liberate the Philippines. Join us as we uncover the strategic brilliance, heroic sacrifices, and technological innovations that defined this epic confrontation, from Taffy 3’s courageous stand to Halsey’s controversial decisions, and learn how the U.S. Navy’s triumph reshaped the course of the war.

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Strategic Context of Leyte Gulf

The Allies pushed forward across the Pacific during mid-1944 with the objective of freeing the Philippines from Japanese control. The strategic location of Leyte made it the first target for Allied forces to disrupt Japanese supply routes and establish an operational base. According to Volume XII by Morison, General Douglas MacArthur's vow to return to the Philippines was the driving force behind the operation planning while Admiral Chester W. Nimitz provided naval support coordination (Leyte, p. 3).

The operation demanded tremendous logistical coordination that brought together the U.S. Third and Seventh Fleets led by Admirals William F. Halsey and Thomas C. Kinkaid together with more than 700 ships such as carriers and amphibious vessels.

The Japanese military developed an urgent strategy named Sho-Go (Victory Operation) to oppose the invasion while struggling with limited resources. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) sent almost its entire surface fleet to defend Leyte as they deemed it a critical battleground along with the battleship Yamato. Morison calls Sho-Go a final attempt to destroy the landing forces and deliver a major counterattack (The Two-Ocean War, p. 412).

The Japanese plan divided their forces into three groups: Three separate Japanese naval forces were deployed during the operation with Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa leading the Northern Force to draw away Halsey’s Third Fleet while Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita commanded the Center Force to strike at the invasion beaches and Vice Admirals Shoji Nishimura and Kiyohide Shima piloted the Southern Force to advance through Surigao Strait into Leyte Gulf.

The Battle’s Four Major Engagements

The Battle of Leyte Gulf consisted of four distinct encounters: the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, the Battle of Surigao Strait, the Battle off Samar, and the Battle off Cape Engaño which showcased strategic maneuvers alongside technological innovations like radar-directed gunfire and carrier-based air strikes with human command decisions directing this pivotal World War II battle in the Pacific Theater. Through his detailed narratives in History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume XII: Morison's work History of United States Naval Operations in World War II Volume XII: Leyte and The Two-Ocean War provides an intense and detailed depiction of the naval battles during the war through the use of sailors' personal accounts, official naval documents and his own observations as a naval officer while showcasing the complexity and historical value of each battle.


1. The Battle of the Sibuyan Sea took place on October 24, 1944.

U.S. submarines first discovered Kurita’s Center Force nearing the Sibuyan Sea which initiated the battle. Halsey's Third Fleet delivered air strikes from its carrier groups against Kurita's fleet which contained the super-battleships Yamato and Musashi. Morison evaluates the power of U.S. naval aviation by stating “the day of the big gun was over” because aircraft inflicted devastating blows (Leyte, p. 182). After withstanding approximately 19 torpedo strikes and 17 bomb impacts during continuous air assaults the Musashi eventually sank. Even though Kurita suffered heavy losses he chose to advance which maintained the threat. Morison points out Halsey’s oversight regarding reconnaissance which enabled Kurita to navigate through San Bernardino Strait without detection (The Two-Ocean War, p. 418). The failure to maintain proper reconnaissance resulted in significant repercussions during later battles.


2. During October 24–25 of 1944 the Battle of Surigao Strait took place.

When Nishimura and Shima led their Southern Force through Surigao Strait to reach Leyte Gulf they met with strong resistance from Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf’s Seventh Fleet which was ready for battle. Morison refers to this naval battle as a perfect illustration of naval strategy because Oldendorf applied the classic "crossing the T" maneuver (Leyte, p. 223). The American battleships which included survivors from Pearl Harbor obliterated Nishimura's ships during a battle that saw the sinking of battleships Fuso and Yamashiro. Shima’s trailing force retreated after minimal engagement. Morison commends Oldendorf's effective command of destroyers, PT boats, and battleships and states that the battle demonstrated how surface gunnery retains its value in particular situations (The Two-Ocean War, p. 421). The triumph ensured safe passage for the Leyte invasion forces through the southern approach.


3. The Battle off Samar (October 25, 1944)

Kurita’s Center Force caught a small U.S. task group named Taffy 3 off Samar by surprise during the battle which Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague directed. Taffy 3 consisted solely of escort carriers and destroyer escorts which struggled against Kurita’s superior battleships and cruisers. Morison describes Taffy 3's "heroic resistance" by highlighting destroyers such as the USS Johnston performing bold torpedo attacks while aircraft harried the enemy using available ammunition including depth charges (Leyte, p. 258). Taffy 3 inflicted heavy losses despite the USS Gambier Bay sinking and multiple destroyers going down because their tenacity combined with smoke screens deceived Kurita into thinking he was up against a larger force leading to his withdrawal. The historian Morison identifies Kurita's withdrawal as a result of psychological shock and communication failures which proved pivotal in protecting the invasion beaches (The Two-Ocean War, p. 426).


4. The Battle off Cape Engaño occurred on October 25, 1944.

Halsey directed his forces toward Ozawa’s Northern Force which functioned as a decoy consisting of carriers with minimal armament. Morison disapproves of Halsey's choice to pursue the decoy "bait" which left San Bernardino Strait unprotected and Taffy 3 vulnerable to Kurita's assault (Leyte, p. 192). Halsey's fleet destroyed Ozawa's ships by sinking four carriers yet this achievement resulted from a strategic blunder. Morison states that Halsey’s aggressive pursuit demonstrated his personal style yet undermined their main objective (The Two-Ocean War, p. 424). The elimination of the Northern Force ended Japan's carrier operations but made no significant difference to safeguard the ongoing invasion attempt.

Technological Dynamics

Morison explains how naval combat underwent a fundamental change during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Carrier-based aviation clearly demonstrated its supremacy through the U.S. aircraft's effective attacks on Japanese surface ships. According to Morison the sinking of Musashi demonstrated that even heavily armored battleships were susceptible to air attack (Leyte, p. 186). The U.S. military achieved devastating results at night in Surigao Strait through effective use of radar-directed gunfire. Japanese forces faced coordination difficulties because their radar and communication systems were substandard.

The battle demonstrated the constraints technology posed during the operation. According to Morison inadequate reconnaissance paired with faulty communications enabled Kurita to avoid U.S. detection post-Sibuyan Sea battle (The Two-Ocean War, p. 419). The use of radio silence to safeguard operational secrecy occasionally slowed decision-making processes which became evident through Halsey’s delayed reaction to the crisis faced by Taffy 3. The interaction between emerging technologies demonstrated that effective military operations require integrating advanced tools with strategic decision-making skills.

USS New Jersey’s Pivotal Role in Surigao Strait

The USS New Jersey (BB-62) played a vital role in the Battle of Surigao Strait through its operations as part of Task Group 77.2 under Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf. During the Battle of Leyte Gulf the USS New Jersey (BB-62) demonstrated its might as an Iowa-class battleship while delivering its most significant impact in the Battle of Surigao Strait from October 24-25, 1944. New Jersey served as an essential component of Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf’s Task Group 77.2 where it worked in tandem with battleships West Virginia, Maryland, Mississippi, Tennessee, and California to deliver a textbook ambush on Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura’s Southern Force which aimed to disrupt the Allied invasion of Leyte, Philippines.

New Jersey strategically positioned itself to "cross the T" of the Japanese fleet during the night battle and fired 96 rounds of 16-inch radar-directed gunfire to devastate enemy vessels with impressive accuracy. The concentrated attack led to the destruction of battleships Yamashiro and Fuso along with heavy cruiser Mogami and three destroyers which resulted in complete annihilation of Nishimura’s naval force. The advanced Mark 8 fire-control radar on the ship enabled precise targeting capabilities at night and demonstrated the U.S. Navy's advanced night-fighting abilities. The New Jersey ship protected Allied forces by utilizing its powerful anti-aircraft armament which included twenty 5-inch guns and multiple 40mm and 20mm cannons to defend against Japanese air attacks during the Leyte campaign.

New Jersey functioned as a command base by temporarily hosting Admiral William Halsey’s Third Fleet staff during the operation and stood ready to reinforce different battles including the Battle off Samar despite being too far for direct contribution. The New Jersey's 45,000-ton displacement combined with 33-knot speed and 12.1-inch armor made it a uniquely versatile and resilient battleship. The ship’s crew of almost 2,000 members worked with disciplined efficiency to maintain the seamless operation of complex systems even during combat stress. The destruction of Japan’s Southern Force in Surigao Strait by Allied forces marked the final battleship-versus-battleship battle in history while ensuring Allied dominance in the Pacific theater and New Jersey played a key role.

The victory protected the Leyte invasion while hastening the downfall of Japanese naval forces which allowed Allied forces to push forward. New Jersey became one of World War II’s legendary ships because of its role at Leyte Gulf, while its 19 battle stars from various wars solidified this status.

Logistical Challenges and Triumphs

The magnitude of the Leyte operation required extraordinary logistical management which Morison calls a “miracle of planning and execution” (Leyte, p. 12). The U.S. Navy was responsible for moving more than 200,000 soldiers and enormous equipment loads over extensive distances. The Third and Seventh Fleets worked together with the Seventh Fleet offering immediate support for landing operations while the Third Fleet executed distant bombardment missions. In his work The Two-Ocean War (p. 415), Morison focuses on how auxiliary support ships like tankers, repair vessels, and supply ships ensured fleet operations remained functional.

The Japanese military suffered from extreme logistical limitations. The IJN was forced to conduct operations from remote bases due to fuel shortages which restricted their operational mobility. According to Morison, fuel shortages on the Yamato and other vessels affected Kurita's choice to retreat near Samar (Leyte, p. 261). The United States Navy achieved crucial battle success through its superior logistical system which combined industrial power with forward positioning of bases.

Decision Matrix: Leyte Gulf

Strategic Decision Decision-maker Rationale Outcome Strategic Impact
Focus on the Philippines instead of Formosa/Taiwan General MacArthur • Philippines easier to defend than Formosa
• Would sever Japanese supply lines
• Fulfill promise to liberate Philippines[1][3]
• Strategy adopted by Allied command
• President Roosevelt approved
• Won over Nimitz and Marshall
• Successful invasion of Philippines
• Strategy to cut off Japan from Southeast Asia[5]
• Established springboard for further operations
SHO-GO Plan: Deploy decoy carrier force while main force attacks landing area Admiral Toyoda • Lure US Third Fleet carriers away from Leyte Gulf
• Allow battleships to attack vulnerable transport ships[7]
• Successfully drew Halsey's forces north
• Center Force nearly reached transport ships
• Created temporary vulnerability in US naval defenses
• Failed to achieve strategic objective of stopping the landing[5]
Commit nearly all remaining naval assets to battle Imperial Japanese Navy • Last chance to achieve victory
• Potentially halt Allied advance
• Deter invasion of Japan[2][6]
• Catastrophic losses for Japanese Navy
• Lost most remaining capital ships
• Effectively ended the Japanese Navy as an effective fighting force
• Removed naval threat to further US operations in the Pacific[6]
Pursue Japanese carrier force northward Admiral Halsey (Third Fleet) • Destroying carriers seen as primary mission
• Believed Kinkaid could handle surface threats[6]
• Left San Bernardino Strait unguarded
• US escort carriers left to face battleships off Samar
• Created dangerous vulnerability for US amphibious forces
• Highlighted command coordination problems in US forces[6]
Kurita's decision to withdraw rather than continue to Leyte Gulf Admiral Kurita (Center Force) • Fuel concerns
• Crew exhaustion
• Uncertainty about enemy position
• Concerns about air attacks[6]
• Japanese Center Force retreated
• Preserved some Japanese naval assets
• Missed opportunity to attack vulnerable US transport ships
• Allowed successful Allied landing operations to continue[6]
Maintain divided command structure in the Pacific US Joint Chiefs of Staff • Compromise between Army and Navy leadership
• Allow both MacArthur and Nimitz to maintain authority[6]
• Poor coordination between Third and Seventh Fleets
• Confusion about responsibility for San Bernardino Strait[6]
• Nearly allowed Japanese Center Force to succeed
• Created communication problems in US forces[6]
Deploy radar technology for early detection US Navy • Technological advantage to detect enemy movements
• Early warning of Japanese forces[8]
• Early detection of Japanese task force on October 23
• USS Darter detected Japanese fleet[8]
• Allowed US forces to prepare and respond effectively
• Contributed significantly to US victory[8]
First organized kamikaze attacks Imperial Japanese Navy • Compensate for lack of trained pilots
• Maximize damage with limited resources[2]
• Damaged several US ships
• Psychological impact on US forces
• Introduced new threat to US naval operations
• Foreshadowed desperate tactics late in the war

Key Takeaways

  • Superiority of Naval Aviation: The sinking of Musashi and destruction of Ozawa’s carriers demonstrate carrier-based air power dominance according to Morison. The naval conflict demonstrated that battleships had become outdated as the main weapon of naval forces.

  • Importance of Coordination: The victory of the Seventh Fleet at Surigao Strait illustrated excellent inter-unit coordination which stood in stark contrast to Halsey’s mistake of chasing Ozawa without first securing San Bernardino Strait.

  • Human Factors in Command: The battle outcome was heavily influenced by psychological and personality-driven choices demonstrated through Kurita’s withdrawal from Samar and Halsey’s aggressive pursuit.

  • Heroism Under Pressure: Taffy 3’s outnumbered sailors and pilots displayed exceptional bravery which demonstrated the determination of the U.S. Navy to transform what seemed like an impending defeat into a military success.

  • Logistical Triumph: Morison highlights the U.S. Navy's logistical superiority through its capability to support large invasion forces over long distances in both his books.

  • Technological Transition: The conflict demonstrated the transition from naval artillery to air power dominance where radar systems and aircraft played crucial roles despite communication issues that identified improvement needs.

Final Thoughts

Although the Battle of Leyte Gulf demonstrated American naval superiority it contained important shortcomings. Morison’s writings detail how the campaign showcased exceptional tactics alongside expensive mistakes and remarkable valor. After the U.S. Navy defeated the IJN, Allied forces gained control of the Philippines which set the course toward Japan’s eventual surrender. The flawed decision-making of Halsey and Kurita’s withdrawal demonstrate how structured military strategies crumble amid wartime turmoil. Morison describes Leyte Gulf as the final significant engagement of the battleship-dominated Navy before transitioning into the air power era (The Two-Ocean War, p. 429).

The strategic insights from this battle continue to inform naval warfare and leadership through lessons about adaptability, courage and technological integration. The enduring legacy of the battle stands as a tribute to both the resilience and ingenuity displayed by its combatants and keeps alive the memory of Taffy 3 and additional forces as crucial to the Allied success in the Pacific.